



S W E D E N

STATEMENT

by

H.E. Ambassador Hans Lundborg.

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Thank you Mr President

First of all I would like to convey to you the Swedish Government's warmest congratulations on your election as President of the 52nd General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. My delegation welcomes the three new member states of the Agency the Sultanate of Oman, the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea.

Sweden fully associates itself with the statement made by France on behalf of the European Union.

Mr President,

This year marks the 40th anniversary of the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Over the past 40 years the NPT has become one of the most valuable instruments of collective security. It has played a key role in safeguarding international peace and continues to do so. The NPT has virtually universal support, more than any comparable document apart from the Charter of the United Nations. The objective is clear: The NPT has to remain the realistic response to the nuclear challenge and it has to continue to be successful in the fight against proliferation.

The non-proliferation commitment is shared by many but sadly not by all. We face the growing danger of nuclear proliferation extending into more troublesome and complex regions. Iran is not the only case but perhaps the most worrisome at present. Recent developments in the DPRK are also of concern. Still, a single state actor might be coped with by the logic of deterrence. But what lies ahead is the risk of a new phase of proliferation extending to one country after another in volatile parts of the world.

Only effective multilateralism can deal with the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons, to states and non-state actors. The risks of nuclear terrorism or illegal diversion and trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials must be countered. The Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material alongside IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security, verification and national implementation of international instruments are very important in this respect.

The IAEA verification system is a key component of the non-proliferation regime. The countering of proliferation in an effective manner requires a solid and effective safeguards system. Sweden has – as many others – persistently stressed the critical importance of the Additional Protocol. Albeit the voluntary nature of an Additional Protocol, its conclusion serves as confirmation that a country is acting not only according to the letter, but also to the spirit, of the NPT. We consider that the Additional Protocols together with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements represent the universal standard for nuclear verification.

Mr. President,

A functioning multilateral mechanism would contribute to achieving non-proliferation goals. The issue of the multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle has been discussed for many years in the IAEA framework and elsewhere. Sweden believes that the time has come to start moving towards the phase of selecting the options best suited for implementation. In this regard, Sweden would like to draw the attention to the EU statement at the General Conference, where the EU states that the Union will consider whether an EU contribution to the Nuclear Threat Initiative on the elaboration of an MNA mechanism within the IAEA framework could be possible and feasible.

A number of MNA proposals have been presented to the IAEA. Just very recently interesting documentation on the German proposal on the Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP) was circulated to IAEA Member States. Sweden very much appreciates the German ambitions and ambitious efforts to achieve progress on the MNA issue.

Mr. President,

On 1 July this year the two nuclear regulatory bodies in Sweden; the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and the Radiation Protection Authority were merged and a new integrated regulatory body was formed; the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. The merger will provide a more efficient and effective supervision with combined resources. The new regulatory body will continue the important international cooperation and organisational

memberships of its predecessors. The new regulatory body will be well equipped to meet the new challenges ahead of it as concerns safety, security and safeguards.

The Swedish nuclear power programme, established in the 1960-70ies, is currently in a dynamic phase. Following the closure of the two Barsebäck power reactors a few years ago, 10 reactors remain in operation. The extensive modernisation and safety upgrading of the 10 operating Swedish reactors are continuing in order to make the reactors fit for operation for 40 years and beyond. The whole modernisation programme is expected to be finalised within five years.

As a result of the Forsmark event 2006, where parts of the emergency power systems failed, the former Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate initiated extensive experience feedback efforts on these issues in international fora, including the Agency. The seminar held in Sweden in September 2007 attracted many more participants than expected. The involved electrical systems issues received worldwide attention. Sweden would like to thank the Agency for its support to that effect. Sweden would also like to thank the Agency for a successful OSART mission to the Forsmark site in February this year. The mission confirmed that Forsmark NPP has taken relevant corrective actions but also provided a number of recommendations and suggestions. The report has been made public. The next two years also two other plants will receive OSART missions in order to complete the international assessment of the safety work at the Swedish nuclear power plants.

Sweden strongly supports the International Regulatory Review Service of the Agency and will continue to provide experts to the IRRS mission teams. In a near future Sweden will also request an IRRS- mission to review the new regulatory body.

Mr. President,

Installations serving the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in Sweden currently include a final repository for low and intermediate level waste and an interim storage plant for spent nuclear fuel. According to the industry concept for spent nuclear fuel disposal, the spent fuel will be encapsulated into copper canisters before being placed in a deep geological final repository.

Before summer of 2009 the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, jointly owned by the Swedish nuclear power industry, will announce in which municipality the company

would like to build the final repository for spent nuclear fuel. The formal application for the final repository will, according to the industry's time schedule, be presented in 2010. The application will be reviewed by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and the Environmental Court prior to the final decision by the Government.

Mr President,

Sweden continues to closely follow and participate in the ongoing review of the International Basic Safety Standards for protection against ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. Sweden considers it of utmost importance that the review takes full account of the recently adopted Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) as well as of the new Safety Fundamentals. The new BSS can be expected to substantially enhance and harmonise the actions taken within the international community to protect human health and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation. The Agency's leadership in this work is highly appreciated.

Efforts for the continuous improvement of nuclear safety and security, as they apply to Swedish nuclear facilities, also have an external dimension. Sweden is investing around 6 million € per year in technical cooperation programmes designed for the improvement of reactor safety, nuclear non-proliferation measures, radioactive and nuclear waste management and radiation protection. Currently, these programmes mainly focus on cooperation with the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Additional technical cooperation programmes in the field of nuclear non-proliferation have been initiated in Armenia and Georgia. The Agency's Safety Standards form the basis for this cooperation.

Finally, Mr. President,

This years Scientific Forum on The Future Role of the IAEA provided us with useful ideas as to the further development of the '20/20 vision' and we thank the Commission of Eminent Persons for its elaborate and useful contribution to the process of shaping the role of the IAEA for the future.

The Commission's idea of creating an 'Additional Protocol Plus' for the purpose of enhancing verification and strengthening the safeguards system and, ultimately, the IAEA's ability to provide the necessary confidence, is a very interesting idea. Such a 'Protocol Plus' would

confirm the Agency's right and obligation to access sites and information related to nuclear material production technologies and to nuclear weaponization activities, as well as the Agency's right to private interviews with individuals who may know about such activities.

Thank you, Mr President