Disarmament and non-proliferation

International regulatory frameworks

A key component of Swedish foreign policy is to safeguard existing treaties and agreements. Sweden is also working, particularly within the framework of the EU, to encourage all states to accede to existing treaties (universalisation), and to get a sufficient number of states to ratify treaties so that they can enter into force (e.g. the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty).

Sweden attaches great importance to international regulations and supports the work of international organisations. This is reflected in the fact that Sweden was a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors from 20042007, and is currently a member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council. These bodies are responsible for control activities that are a very important part of non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

To facilitate international cooperation regarding non-proliferation, a number of multilateral export control regimes are in place, each with some forty countries participating: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee (ZC), the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). These regimes identify goods and technologies that could be misused for the production of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (dual-use products), and the export of which should be controlled in a coordinated manner by the participating countries. More information is available under the heading Export controls in the left-hand column.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

"The fact that [review of the NPT in 2010] is of the greatest importance hardly needs any further emphasis.
The goal ahead of this very important meeting must be a 'grand bargain', where a universally accepted balance is finally reached between binding commitments on accelerated nuclear disarmament and a universally accepted enhancement of the non-proliferation regimes."

- Carl Bildt in the Riksdag, 11 September 2008

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is of primary importance. It has three central components:

- nuclear disarmament,
- non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
- peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Treaty is based on an overall agreement called the 'grand bargain' between the states that had nuclear weapons at the end of the 1960s and other states. Under this agreement, nuclear weapon states committed themselves to negotiate in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament in exchange for commitments by the non-nuclear weapon states to refrain from trying to obtain nuclear weapons. It is important that both these commitments are fulfilled.

Sweden consistently emphasises the need for balanced progress in both areas in the form of genuine disarmament of nuclear weapons and effective measures to prevent proliferation to new states. The most recent review conference within NPT in 2005 is regarded as a failure. The next review will be conducted in the spring of 2010.

EU

EU cooperation and its role in disarmament and non-proliferation have grown in recent years (link). Sweden considers it important that the EU pursue a policy that includes both disarmament and non-proliferation.

In 2003, the EU adopted a strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (link). The strategy is being implemented through such means as providing contributions to organisations and projects (such as support to the IAEA, CTBTO, OPCW, Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation), and by adding a non-proliferation clause to cooperation agreements between the EU and third countries.

In 2008, the EU agreed on an action plan against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (link), which builds further on the strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is intended that the action plan be implemented by the end of 2010.

At a Council meeting in December 2008, the EU adopted conclusions on multilateral nuclear fuel guarantees (link), in which it is stated that the EU plans to contribute up to EUR 25 million to the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank placed under the control of the IAEA.

At the same meeting, the EU also adopted conclusions on a code of conduct for outer space activities. The code of conduct constitutes a proposal, on which the EU will continue to hold consultations with other countries.

In December 2008, EU heads of state and government endorsed a declaration on tighter international security, with special focus on issues related to disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and prevention of terrorism (link). The declaration also expresses support for a global reduction of the worlds nuclear arsenals in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, that all states accede to the CTBT, that negotiations be initiated on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and that states that possess tactical nuclear weapons include them in negotiation processes on arms control and disarmament. The declaration also includes a proposal on initiating negotiations on an international treaty to prohibit short and medium range surface-to-surface missiles.

Implementation is continuing of the EU strategy on an action plan to combat destabilising accumulations and dissemination of small arms and light weapons (SALW), adopted by the EU in 2005 (link). The strategy deals with measures at both international and regional level in the EU. In December 2008, the EU adopted conclusions on the introduction of a special SALW clause in international agreements between the EU and third countries. (See more about SALW below.)

Sweden and the EU take an active role in work with the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The code entails a political commitment to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technology without this preventing states from possessing launchers for civilian space programmes. The EU supports the code through a joint measure that involves arranging seminars and outreach activities.

Current issues

In spring 2009, Russia and the USA began negotiations on replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires in December 2009. The Treaty places ceilings on the number of nuclear warheads and their means of delivery that countries are allowed to have. Efforts to encourage Russia and the USA to continue reducing their nuclear arsenals are important, not least because of their commitments within the framework of the overall work to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In May 2009, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva adopted a work programme that provides new opportunities to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). This can be considered a major, important step in moving disarmament issues forward. This is particularly true considering that the work of the Conference on Disarmament has been blocked for 12 years due to differences concerning the work programme.

Below is an account of several issues that are of interest during the Swedish Presidency of the EU:

- Entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

In order for the Treaty to enter into force, it must be ratified by 44 specified countries. Nine of these have not yet ratified it (USA, China, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and North Korea). Sweden is working, primarily through the EU, to convince these states to ratify the Treaty, since the CTBT is part of the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Efforts are also being made to ensure the success of the Article XIV Conference (CTBT's special forum), which will be held in New York on 23-25 September 2009.

- Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNA)

MNA entails the assurance of nuclear fuel deliveries to states that, for political reasons, are denied access to such fuel. Sweden and the EU are actively working to establish an international nuclear fuel bank placed under the control of the IAEA. Concrete proposals have been submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors for discussion.

- Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

In 2005, the EU decided to promote work within the UN to formulate a global, legally binding arms trade treaty. The goal is to establish an international system of rules with common criteria and agreed principles for all transfers of conventional arms.

In autumn 2008, the UN General Assembly decided that an open-ended working group (OEWG) should meet for a total of six weeks during the period 2009-2011 to tackle this task. In 2009, the working group met for a week in March, and will meet for a week in July. Sweden will play an important role during the latter meeting when it holds the Presidency of the EU. In this capacity, Sweden will also take part in a number of regional seminars during the autumn in the Middle East, southern Africa and Asia.

Regional non-proliferation issues

Iran
All parties to the NPT have the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is of the utmost importance, however, that the international community has complete confidence that no one abuses this right. Since the mid-1980s, Iran has kept extensive nuclear activities secret rather than declaring them to the IAEA and through its actions has thus undermined this confidence. In order to restore international confidence, far-reaching demands have been placed on Iran, first by the IAEA Board of Governors and later, in 2006, by the UN Security Council.

In accordance with the IAEA Statute, the issue of Iran's nuclear programme was reported to the UN Security Council in the beginning of 2006. In July 2006, after the IAEA had spent over three years trying to clarify all aspects of Irans nuclear programme, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1696. This Resolution requires that Iran suspend all enrichment-related activities and encourages all Member States to exercise special vigilance regarding export controls of products that could contribute to Iran's nuclear and missile programmes. The Security Council consequently adopted Resolutions 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007) and 1803 (March 2008). These later resolutions require that, in addition to discontinuing all activities related to enrichment, Iran also terminate activities associated with reprocessing of heavy water (including construction of a heavy water reactor). These three resolutions also contain sanctions in a number of different areas, focusing on the nuclear and missile programmes. Security Council Resolution 1835, which was adopted in September 2008, confirms the conditions imposed on Iran in previously adopted resolutions. In June 2010, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 which further expands the sanctions.

The EU is implementing the sanctions contained in the Security Council Resolutions through a common position and a Council regulation, which have been updated on various occasions. Work is under way to up-date them again because changes in Security Council Resolution 1929.

The EU, the USA, Russia and China have previously offered Iran increased cooperation in a number of areas, including civilian nuclear energy, if a negotiated agreement can be reached on a sustainable, proliferation-proof solution to the issue. The UN resolutions urge Iran to consider this offer.

Sweden and the EU emphasise Iran's obligation to comply with Security Council resolutions and urge Iran to obey the demands of the IAEA Board of Governors. This means that Iran should display all the transparency and provide whatever access the IAEA needs to be able to answer outstanding questions concerning Iran's nuclear programme. Sweden and the EU are working to resolve the issue by political and diplomatic means.

North Korea
On 25 May 2009, North Korea conducted a nuclear test and also launched several short-range missiles. This was condemned by Sweden, the EU and the UN Security Council.

The North Korean launch in April 2009 has been condemned by Sweden and the EU as a breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1718. Sweden and the EU support the demand that North Korea must abandon all nuclear weapon and missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as established by UN Security Council Resolution 1718. The joint statement made by the participants of the Six-Party Talks (North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the USA) in September 2005, in which North Korea agreed to phase out these programmes, must be implemented.

UN Security Council Resolution 1718 concerning North Korea introduces bans on the transfer to North Korea of heavy military equipment and products that could be used for the country's programme for weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and also luxury goods. The resolution also bans financial services associated with such transfers. The EU has adopted a common position and a Council regulation to follow up the commitments under Resolution 1718 at EU level.

• Link to the MFA international sanctions webpage
• Link to the EU declaration
• Resolution 1929

UN Resolution 1540: non-state actors

Preventing terrorist groups and other non-state actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction is a very important task. The UN Security Council has adopted Resolution 1540, which lists a number of measures that all states are to take in this area.

The resolution aims at preventing non-state actors from gaining access to products that could be used in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Security Council adopted follow-up resolutions in April 2006 (Resolution 1673) and in April 2008 (Resolution 1810).

Resolution 1540 stipulates that all states are required to establish domestic controls aimed at preventing the proliferation of the above-mentioned products. The Security Council has established the 1540 Committee, tasked with reporting on implementation of the resolution to the Council. All UN Member States have been requested to provide information on the steps they have taken or intend to take to implement the resolution. Sweden has submitted its reports to the Committee.

The EU has adopted a joint action in support of the resolution that includes such measures as arranging workshops in third countries. The aim is to increase awareness of the requirements stipulated in the resolution and to strengthen the countries' administrative capacity to carry out their commitments.

• Link to the 1540 Committee's website
• Link to the EU's joint action

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Cooperation on concrete measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presented by a group of states in Krakow in 2004, known as the Proliferation Security Initiative, is an important supplement to multilateral regulations and export controls. Sweden and the EU support the initiative and try to help ensure that it works as well as possible, for example by taking part in exercises.

• Link to the PSI website

G8 Global Partnership

There are materials and facilities leftover from previous arsenals or arms production in the former Soviet Union. In 2002, the G8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the USA) took an initiative to account for and secure these materials and to channel former weapons scientists to the civil sector. Sweden and the EU also help in this work. The current recipient countries for projects under the initiative are primarily Russia and Ukraine.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

The initiative was jointly launched by the USA and Russia in July 2006. Sweden became a partner to the initiative in 2007. The goal is to cooperate on issues such as safe handling of nuclear material and radioactive material and processes, and improving the opportunities to identify and trace such materials so as to prevent illicit trade in them. Seminars with experts who exchange experiences and best practices are regularly conducted within the framework of the initiative.

Small arms and light weapons (SALW)

International efforts to limit the quantity and proliferation of small arms and light weapons are primarily aimed at implementing the action plan adopted by the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

A first review conference on the action plan was held in 2006. The participating states could not reach agreement on a final document at the conference, and therefore no proposal on expanding the action programme could be adopted. However, the present action plan is still being implemented. In the summer of 2008, a third implementation conference was held and a final document was produced. This was an important step forward after the unsuccessful review conference in 2006. The next review conference will be held in 2010.

In the EU as well, work concerning SALW is based on an action plan to combat destabilising accumulations and dissemination of small arms and light weapons, which was adopted in December 2005 (link). Under a decision from 2008, all agreements that the EU enters into with third countries must contain a SALW clause, i.e. a provision that obligates the parties to the agreement to comply with existing international agreements on combating excessive accumulations of SALW and illicit trade in such arms.

On a practical level, actors including the EU are conducting extensive development assistance activities both bilaterally and multilaterally to combat and reduce the illicit dissemination of small arms and light weapons.

• EU Strategy to combat SALW
• UN Programme of Action to Prevent SALW

Particularly inhumane weapons

The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is an important part of international humanitarian law. The Convention regulates or bans various types of weapons, including incendiary weapons, permanently blinding laser weapons, and mines and explosive remnants of war. The latest negotiations within the framework of the CCW have dealt with anti-vehicle mines and cluster munitions, and have not yet been concluded. For many years, Sweden has been trying to introduce a resolution in the UN General Assembly's First Committee in support of the Convention.

Sweden signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in December 2008. This Convention was negotiated within the framework of the Oslo Process, and agreement on the convention text was reached at a meeting in Dublin in May 2008. The Convention contains a ban against using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining or transferring cluster munitions. It also contains rules on storage and destruction, clearance, assistance to victims of cluster munitions, international cooperation and assistance, and relations and cooperation with states that are not party to the Convention.

Anti-personnel mines

The Ottawa Convention (Mine Ban Treaty, MBT) entered into force in 1999 and over 150 states are currently party to it. The primary aim of the Convention is a total ban on the use, development, production, acquisition, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines. Stockpiles of anti-personnel mines are to be destroyed. Sweden completed the destruction of its national stockpile in 2002. The Convention grants exemptions for the retention of a number of mines for training purposes and for the development of mine clearance techniques. These are to be accounted for each year through reports on the purpose and plans for how the retained mines are used for development and training purposes, and on how the stock is successively depleted.

The other main aim of the Convention is for a number of measures to be taken to deal with the consequences of earlier use of anti-personnel mines. This includes mine clearance, assistance to mine victims and help with the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. Each year, Sweden provides over SEK 100 million to support measures of this kind.