Tal
Almedalen, Visby 5 juli 2009
Sten Tolgfors, Försvarsminister

Anförande av försvarsminister Sten Tolgfors i Almedalen om Östersjösamarbetet

(det talade ordet gäller)

Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Baltic Sea region has lived through two decades of fundamental strategic shifts. Today, the Baltic Sea is lined by EU and NATO countries. The only exceptions being Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg.
The fact that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are members of the EU and of Nato benefits their own security, and that of Sweden as well.
When I worked at the Ministry of Defence in 1992-93, this could not be taken for granted. The old order had fallen; a new order had yet to be established.
Like Poland and East Germany, the Baltic States had freed themselves. Germany had been reunited, but what was to happen next?
It was a time when the Western European Union (WEU) was proposed as a European alternative to NATO. A time when pessimists claimed that the Baltic States would never meet the requirements of the EU or NATO. The pessimists were completely wrong.
A new European security order was the result of solid determination on the part of the Baltic States and forward-looking policy by the EU and NATO, encouraged by Sweden.
Sweden cooperated closely with the US on Baltic Sea issues. We were able to act as a bridge for them in the unification of this part of Europe.
The Baltic States carried out extensive economic and political reforms. Sweden paved the way to the EU through unilateral free trade agreements, which we later brought with us into the EU. We provided support to their security structures, establishing cooperation projects that are still running.
Almost two decades later, we greatly benefit from these joint efforts. The Baltic Sea region is completely integrated into the European security order. This is a fundamental difference compared to the Caucasus, where questions still remain concerning those countries future relation to Nato and EU. The area continues to be vulnerable to Russian interference and pressure.
If anyone were to act against a Baltic State - the way Russia acted against Georgia - that would have fundamental security policy implications. EU membership matters. Nato membership counts.
A number of countries in the Baltic Sea region are going through difficult economic times and political challenges. These challenges, are best handled within the framework of the European and Euro-Atlantic security order.

Solidarity

For the last 15 years, our countries have not faced any threat of invasion. An armed attack directed directly against Sweden is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
This does not mean that we can rule out the risk of military conflicts, or incidents, in the Baltic Sea region.
However, it is not possible to envisage a military threat that would affect only Sweden or any other single country in our region, without at the same time affecting the other countries. Sweden builds security together with other countries, with the Nordic countries and the EU.
Sweden shares values and interests with the EU and the Nordic and Baltic countries. One expression of this is our declaration of solidarity.
Sweden would not stand passive if a neighbour is threatened or attacked. We expect others not to stand passive if Sweden is threatened. We must be able both to provide and receive support, with relevant capabilities, also of a military nature.
This is a clear statement of political will. Sweden will decide how to act in each individual situation.
This is new challenge for the armed forces, which affects its structure and planning.

Orientation of the armed forces

Sweden is not defended only within it's borders. Incidents, conflicts and war, must be prevented from reaching our borders. Sweden has a clear Baltic Sea perspective in our security policy and military capability priorities.
Previously, the idea was that the Swedish Forces should be able to conduct operations either within the country, or very far away, such as in Chad or Afghanistan. That policy contained a considerable uncertainty - what applied to our own neighbourhood, the Baltic Sea region?
That uncertainty has now been done away with through the new Baltic Sea perspective in the Defence Bill.
Since the present conscript system is only applicable within the country's borders - unless Sweden is directly threatened - the new regional perspective adds importance to a shift to recruitment on a voluntary basis. We are building units with high availability, usable within Sweden, in our region and outside our region.
Russia is concentrating on rapidly mobile operational units. These are available within hours or days, and are intended for operations in Russia or very near Russia. Russia makes it clear that it sees its greatest threats stemming from its southern borders.
The international trend is towards rapidly accessible and mobile units. It is precisely on this point that Sweden lacks the right capability at present.
The threats of the future might materialize very quickly, regardless of their geographical origin or their nature. It is not the old, large-scale invasion that we should be most concerned about. Rapid reaction units and cooperation with others will be necessary if a situation similar to that in Georgia were ever to arise in our region.
It's not primarily a question of having large numbers of soldiers available some time in the future, but rather of having units with a high degree of availability, functionality and quality. It is a question of how quickly we can extend military capabilities to safeguard our country's territorial integrity, sovereignty and uphold security in our region.
We are building a battle group based defence structure, with highly available and usable standing and contracted units. The entire force structure will be usable within a week to defend our country. Our capacity for international operations will be doubled. All units will be trained, exercised and well equipped. Many will be experienced. Our defence capability will be significantly increased.
The structure of Sweden's armed forces will be among the most modern in Europe.

Baltic Sea perspective

The Nordic countries are part of the same region, but due to geographical considerations, we face somewhat different challenges. This has an impact on how we chose our capabilities.
The fact that the Swedish defence policy has a clear Baltic Sea perspective influences our choice of capabilities. The Swedish air force is almost twice the size of that of our neighbours and we have a world-class submarine force.
Finland has a clear land border perspective. The perspective in Norway is focused on the Barents Sea region, and Denmark has a clear focus on international operations. Finland therefore gives priority to the size of its army. Unlike Sweden it has no corvettes or submarines. Norway gives priority to an Arctic Ocean fleet and ground strike air capability. Denmark does not have any submarines or tanks for national use. It is only natural that the Nordic countries give priority to somewhat different capabilities.
It is equally natural with deeper Nordic and regional defence cooperation to achieve greater efficiency as well as increased capability and quality. We complement each other well. Just comparing individual capabilities in the different countries doesn't say much, unless the overall priorities are included.

Civilian threats and risks

The Baltic Sea countries face similar civilian threats and risks. A natural disaster knows no borders, nor do the effects of climate change.
The Baltic Sea has been transformed into a sea energy, with the accompanying risks of accidents and environmental hazards. Oil transports have doubled during the last 10 years and will probably double again. Harbour capacity for energy exports is greatly being expanded. Each year, some 70 000 ships pass Bornholm. At any given time there are 2 000 ships sailing the Baltic Sea - a shallow, secluded inland sea.
In a broad perspective, this is a very positive development. It is a result of increased integration and interaction among the countries of the Baltic Sea region. At the same time, increased traffic poses new challenges for the maritime supervisory authorities and emergency preparedness organisations.
In 2008 there were 135 ship accidents in the Baltic Sea which resulted in pollution. About half of these were due to the human factor.
A few years ago, a series of multinational mine clearance operations in the approaches to Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian harbours revealed a large number of mines, which were cleared. Still, thousands or mines remain in our waters.
We need international cooperation and the capacity of several countries in order to handle major oil spills in the Baltic Sea.

The Swedish Coast Guard has received new state-of-the art maritime surveillance aircraft and will recive additional capability in form of new large oil recovery vessels. But co-operation will still be very much needed.
When we build civil emergency preparedness, we have the same perspective as in our defence policy. We build security together with others. There is a lot to be gained from deeper Nordic and regional cooperation in education, training, preparedness and measures to meet civilian threats and risks. Our capability will be available for use nationally, regionally and internationally.
It should be possible to combine modular-based capabilities from the Nordic and EU countries for rapid operations. Sweden is already building modules for such matters as water purification.
This spring, I hosted the first Nordic ministerial meeting on civilian security. The meeting resulted in the Haga Declaration, which lays a foundation for establishing deeper Nordic cooperation.

Maritime surveillance

In September 1994, M/S Estonia capsized in a heavy storm and claimed over 850 lives. The accident shocked everyone. It became a starting point for an increased co-operation on maritime surveillance. First between Sweden and Finland, now much more widely.
Sea surveillance is carried out by states, but most of the activities and threats that they address are transnational in nature. Within most Member States, surveillance activities fall under the responsibility of several different authorities operating independently from one another. Maritime security systems are fragmented and rarely compatible across agencies, sectors and states.

There is no lack of systems in the region and in the EU. The obstacle is lack of co-ordination and sharing of information.

Sweden has initiated SUCBAS cooperation -Sea Surveillance in the Baltic Sea. It stems from the Swedish and Finnish cooperation SUCFIS, going back to what we learned in 1994.

SUCBAS ensures that authorities in the participating countries can exchange maritime surveillance information and pass it on to other relevant authorities. For example, a suspect vessel detected by Finland in the Gulf of Finland can be handed over to the Swedish surveillance system and later be intercepted by Danish authorities in Danish waters.

At present, there are six countries participating in SUCBAS: Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Germany and Sweden. I hope that SUCBAS will soon be enlarged with Latvia and Poland.

Regional cooperation on air surveillance is equally important. Military air situation data exchange between Finland, Sweden, Norway and the Baltic States, which are NATO members, is accessible through NATO's system, ASDE (Air Situation Data Exchange).

Civilian-military cooperation

Military and civilian maritime surveillance complement each other. It therefore makes sense to create possibilities to exchange information between the two.
For some time, navies have conducted common exercises in the Baltic Sea. The US-led exercise, BALTOPS, has been conducted since 1971, the Loviisa-Series exercises between Sweden and Finland and a number of exercise initiatives between the German, Danish and Swedish navies are some examples.

A new step for cooperation and exercises could be between the region's coast guards and customs authorities. Ideally, the level of cooperation should extend into coordination and sharing of responsibilities.

Conclusion

Approximately 100 out of 500 million EU citizens live and work in the Baltic Sea region. Eight out of nine Baltic Sea countries are members of the EU. Six Baltic Sea countries are part of NATO, and all nine are parties to the Helsinki Commission. This makes the Baltic Sea's state of health a matter of concern for the entire EU.

The Baltic Sea region is one of the more stable regions in the world. However, the importance of natural resources and energy transfer affect the security policy and military development of Europe.
A necessary way forward is a policy for enhanced cooperation and integration, and one that also includes Russia. This can not be handled by the Baltic Sea countries alone, but should be coordinated via the EU.
In the beginning of the 1990's, we did not know what direction developments in our region would take. What we have seen since that time has largely surpassed our expectations. Through integration and cooperation, security for all the countries of the Baltic Sea region has been strengthened. Russia benefits from a prosperous and stable neighbourhood.
The new direction of Swedish security and defence policy underlines that we are deepening the Baltic Sea perspective. As do our priorities for our EU presidency.