Tal av Pål Jonson

Anförande av försvarsminister Pål Jonson vid Clingendael Institute

Publicerad 05 januari 2024

Haag i Nederländerna, 9 november 2023.

Det talade ordet gäller.

Thank you, Rem, for those kind words of introduction. It is great to be here. Congratulations to the Clingendael Institute on your 40th anniversary. Clingendael Institute is really a role model for think tanks in Europe. You have inspired many new ideas that have also been implemented. 

To Kajsa [Ollongren, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands], thank you for your eloquent speech and for the bilateral meeting this morning. We are truly lucky to have you as one of our closest partners as well. 

But we don’t want to be partners any longer. We want to be Allies. I think that when we become Allies, we are going to deepen our cooperation even further. 

Sweden and the Netherlands meet at so many venues. We are both part of the EI2, the Northern Group, the Joint Expeditionary Force and at the table in the EU and NATO. There are great avenues for us to deepen our cooperation.

Both Sweden and the Netherlands are committed Europeanists. We both think that Europe needs to take stronger and greater responsibility for its security and defence. This is a core value. We are committed to European ideas. 

But we are also ardent Atlanticists. We think that the world becomes a better place when Europe and North America cooperate, and when we have effective and good cooperation between the EU and NATO. 

Being both good Europeanists and strong Atlanticists can certainly go hand in hand. There is a win-win between a stronger EU and a stronger NATO. That is also a core value.

Sweden and the Netherlands also share a commitment to and support for Ukraine in all forms. Both our countries have punched above our weight when it comes to supporting Ukraine, at both civilian and military level. We are in it for the long haul, and it is a critical mission for both our countries. 

These three perspectives – the EU, EU-NATO cooperation and Ukraine – fit well into where Europe is right now in the “post-post-Cold War era”. 

We are currently at a crucial time for the Union. The EU is facing the most challenging security environment since the end of the Second World War. We are at day 624 of the horrendous war in Ukraine due to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal aggression. 

We also face global challenges: increased great power competition on the international stage, an increasingly assertive and aggressive China, continued instability in the Sahel and alarming developments in the Middle East. 

Security and defence are moving up on the political agenda for very good reasons. 

The EU does not have the luxury to look inwards or take any kind of strategic pause. We must have the bandwidth to handle a multitude of challenges at the same time. This is the bottom line of why Europe must take greater responsibility for the security of our region. 

There are many measures that we need to take to ensure that. Kajsa, you alluded to defence investments. Defence investments are crucial to ensure capabilities. We are on the right trajectory. Both Sweden and the Netherlands will meet the 2% target on defence investments by next year. Sweden has doubled its defence expenditures since 2020. 

But it is not enough to only spend more. We must spend more efficiently and do so together. Let’s make good use of the new instruments in the EU that are available. Let’s use the European Defence Fund, get more engaged into PESCO projects, use the CARD, and make use of EDIRPA and ASAP more efficiently. The good thing when using these new instruments is that we also find new consortiums for collaboration. 

My first point: defence investments. Second point: using the instruments available to strengthen security and defence, but also to strengthen our defence industrial base. 

We are not only living in challenging times, but also in formative times. In 2024, the United States is heading into election mode as they have their presidential elections. At the same time, Europe will get a new European Parliament and a new European Commission with a new working programme. 2024 is going to be crucial year for Europe and for European security. These are factors that we need to take into consideration. 

My third point: history is changed by good decisions that are implemented. We need to ensure that we deliver on the Strategic Compass from March 2022 and its almost 70 deliverables. There is also good thinking in the Strategic Compass on the nexus between internal and external security. We need to invest more into this nexus, to make sure that our agencies can cooperate and that we have an integrated approach to security – not least when it comes to various forms of hybrid threats. 

My fourth point: we are learning hard lessons from the war in Ukraine. One is that the war in Ukraine is a war of attrition and a war of warehouses. We need a stronger defence industrial base in Europe. A strong industrial base is part of credible deterrence. 

There are a number of issues that we need to address to ensure that the industrial base in Europe is strengthened, including investing more, ramping up production and collaborating more. These are all crucial.

Fora small country of only 10 million people, Sweden has a strong industrial base that produces various platforms. Sweden has been greatly helped by this in our support for Ukraine. Sending CV90s, Archers and the RBS70 becomes easier when you have a strong defense industrial base, and it also opens avenues for cooperation and for supporting Ukraine in the long haul. 

In Europe right now, we have a defence industrial base for a peacetime situation, but not for crisis or conflict. Thus, we must also work harder with regards to security of supply. 

Another lesson that we have learned from the war in Ukraine is the importance of interoperability, standardisation and interchangeability. We need to produce platforms that are interoperable and that can communicate with each other. When it comes to ammunition and supply parts, standardisation is essential to be able to succeed with coalition warfare. 

Second part is partnerships. Common challenges require common action. There are several things that the EU can do to further expand its partnerships. 

During Sweden’s Presidency of the Council of the EU, we arranged the EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum with several political leaders from the Indo-Pacific region. The EU must engage more with the Indo-Pacific region. Both Kajsa and I, together with three other European defence ministers, attended the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2023 together with High Representative Borrell and former Minister of Defence [of Ukraine] Oleksii Reznikov. That kind of engagement and an increased focus by the EU in the Indo-Pacific region are crucial. What is happening in the Euro-Atlantic region is interconnected with developments in the Indo-Pacific region. 

The relations between the EU and the United States are also critical for the transatlantic link. Regarding the EU and NATO, the two organisations have never cooperated as closely as they have in the run-up to and during the war in Ukraine. That is something to build on as well. The third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation states that the EU and NATO should intensify cooperation with regards to, for example, space, new and emerging technologies, and climate change. We need to transform that Joint Declaration into an action plan – because history is changed by decisions that are implemented.

I would also like to thank the Netherlands for the important work that it is doing on military mobility. Military mobility and the ability to move assets and capabilities within the Euro-Atlantic area are essential to ensure credible deterrence. 

In essence, partnerships are important if the EU is to become a stronger geopolitical actor. 

My last point is on Ukraine. 

Ukraine is the defining challenge of our generation. It is crucial that the Ukrainians win this horrendous war and that they have the perspective of joining the EU and NATO. That is our core mission, to which we are very dedicated. 

There are many things that we must do in this regard. A challenge that we are exposed to right now is digging deeper into our pockets and our warehouses, and the limitations on defence material. We must make use of arrangements such as the International Fund for Ukraine as well as the European Peace Facility to ensure that we can provide Ukraine not only with defence material from our warehouses, but also produce new defence material for Ukraine, particularly in critical areas such as artillery ammunition and air defence systems. Transforming our defence industrial base to be able to support Ukraine in the long haul is an important mission. 

The future of Ukraine is critical for European security. When we say that Ukraine is fighting not only for their own security, but also for ours – we really mean it. Ukraine is the shield against Russian military expansion. If Russia is successful in Ukraine, the pressure would mount on countries such as Georgia and Moldova. It would also increase pressure on NATO. Supporting Ukraine is therefore not only the right thing to do, but the smart thing to do. Because it is an investment in our own security. 

Clingendael Institute's State of the Union Conference 2023